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This is my classic paper, written in early 1984, concerning existence and optimal-
ity in general ﬁnancial equilibrium with incomplete markets for nominal assets, just
now being published in a special issue of the Journal of Mathematical Economics.
I. Introduction
This paper presents a fairly general theory of competitive equilibrium when, in ef-
fect, trading across contingent commodities markets is constrained. The novel feature
of my formulation is its representation of such an incomplete market structure as a
purely ﬁnancial phenomenon; trading is constrained simply because there are insuﬃ-
cient contingent claims instruments to provide households with all potentially desirable
credit arrangements. Put succinctly, then, my investigation pursues the implications of
"incomplete" markets following Arrow’s [1] rather than Debreu’s [3, Chapter 7] lead.
In the next section I describe the basic model (which is unfortunately, if unavoidably,
quite notation intensive). The most crucial characteristic of this model is the restric-
tion on rates of return to various ﬁnancial instruments imposed by simple arbitrage
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1considerations. Relying heavily on this restriction, in Sections III and IV I establish
fundamental results concerning existence and optimality. Regarding existence, my main
contribution is a theorem whose hypotheses are comparable in generality to those em-
ployed in standard Walrasian theory. In particular, in contrast to the (Debreuvian)
approach taken in the deservedly inﬂuential paper of Radner [10], my (Arrovian) ap-
proach yields equilibrium without the artiﬁce of introducing arbitrary (and, should I
also say, self-contradictory?) bounds on presumed competitive behavior. On the other
hand, with respect to optimality, my sole contribution is a reﬁnement of the clever
characterization due to Grossman [6] (and erected on foundations provided earlier by
the insightful studies of Diamond [4] and Hart [7]). This patently severe qualiﬁcation
to the two basic theorems of welfare emphasizes that, with incomplete ﬁnancial mar-
kets, competitive allocation is Pareto optimal only relative to a very narrow class of
transaction-constrained perturbations.
Finally, in the concluding section I brieﬂy discuss extensions of two diﬀerent sorts
— ﬁrst, generalizations involving (for example) weaker hypotheses on household charac-
teristics (in the spirit, say, of McKenzie [8]), and second, generalizations involving (for
example) broader speciﬁcation of ﬁnancial instruments (in the spirit, say, of Hart [7] or,
better, Gale [5]). This last analysis suggests one eﬀective treatment for the inherent dif-
ﬁculty associated with endogenous rates of return (a diﬃculty which was also skillfully
diagnosed in Hart’s ﬁne piece).
II. The Model
To avoid obscuring my presentation with inessential technical detail, I consider pure
distribution within the simplest possible intertemporal context, where there are only
two periods, today and tomorrow, denoted by the superscripts 0 and 1, respectively.
There is a priori uncertainty about which of σ possible states of the world will prevail
tomorrow; these are denoted by the superscripts s ∈ S = {1,2,...,σ}.I n t o d a y ’ s
spot market, households can buy and sell — within the limits of their predetermined
endowment income — either goods, which they consume, or bonds, which they hold
until redeemed next period. Then, in tomorrow’s spot market, they can again buy and
sell goods — but now within the limits of their realized endowment cum portfolio income
— which they also consume. Since all transactions take place on spot markets, both
prices (for goods and bonds) and returns (on bonds) are denominated in the unit of
account, say, dollars.
Before making this general framework more speciﬁc, I should ﬁrst emphasize that
there are only two diﬀerences between Arrow’s and my version of contingent claims
markets: First, there are typically fewer available (types of) bonds than potential states,and second, each bond normally yields returns in several states. Thus, in the limiting
case, there may be only a single available bond which yields returns in every state, for
example, money (or, more precisely, inside money).
1. Economic Objects
There are κ physical commodities or goods, denoted by the superscript c ∈ C =
{1,2,...,κ}. Quantities of goods are represented by x0c and x1sc,o rx0 =( x01,x 02,...,x 0κ)
and x1s =( x1s1,x 1s2,...,x 1sκ),o rx =( x0,x 11,x 12,...,x 1σ). Similarly, spot prices of
goods are represented by p0c and p1sc,o rp0 =( p01,p 02,...,p 0κ) and p1s =( p1s1,p 1s2,...,p 1sκ),
or p =( p0,p 11,p 12,...,p 1σ). There are also ι ﬁnancial instruments or bonds,d e -
n o t e db yt h es u p e r s c r i p ti ∈ I = {1,2,...,ι}. Quantities of bonds are represented
by βi or β =( β1,β2,...,βι), their spot prices (in today’s spot market) by ψi or
ψ =( ψ1,ψ2,...,ψι).
The ith bond is a commitment to pay (in tomorrow’s spot market) Pis dollars if
state s occurs. I will assume throughout the paper that there are no more bonds than
states,
ι 5 σ (1)
and, for the most part, that returns are both nonnegative and nontrivial,
Pi =( Pi1,Pi2,...,Piσ) > 0 for i ∈ I.1 (2)
While my analysis therefore also covers the polar case where there may be complete
markets (ι = σ), I will be mainly concerned with the less well understood case where
there aren’t (ι<σ ).
2. Household Behavior
There are η active agents or households, denoted by the subscript h ∈ H =





h ), and preferences over goods, represented by the function
uh : R
κ(σ+1)
+ → R. For the bulk of my analysis I will assume that endowments are strictly
positive, i.e., that
ωh À 0 for h ∈ H, (3)













j00 for every j, with strict inequality for




j00 for every j.and that preferences are continuous, weakly monotone in each of the potential consump-
tion bundles x0
h and x1s
h for s ∈ S, and quasi-concave, i.e., in particular, that
x0
h = x00
h = 0[ resp. x0
h = x00










h)] for h ∈ H.
(4)
Given spot prices (p,ψ), each household chooses its consumption plan xh and portfolio
holdings βh so as to maximize its utility subject to (spot market) budget constraints,




















for h ∈ H. Notice especially that each household is thus free to buy or sell — within the
limits of its budget constraints, of course — any quantity of bonds; if βi
h > 0,t h e ni ti s
a creditor, while if βi
h < 0, it is a debtor (with regard to the particular bond i).
3. Arbitrage Possibilities
The key to my analysis is the fact that the assumptions (2) and (4) together with
the behavior described in (5) entail a severe restriction on the conﬁguration of bond
prices and their returns (which may prevail in competitive equilibrium). This can be
most clearly seen by proceeding in several steps.
(i) Bond prices are strictly positive,
ψ À 0. (6)
Otherwise, if ψi 5 0 for some i, every household would want to buy unbounded
amounts of this bond today, and thereby attain the prospect of unlimited consumption
in some state s (for which Pis > 0) tomorrow.From this ﬁrst observation it follows that, by deﬁning
bi
h ≡ ψiβi
h = dollars invested in bond i by household h
for h ∈ H, i ∈ I and
ris ≡ Pis/ψi = rate of return to bond i in state s
for s ∈ S, i ∈ I, we can streamline the description of household behavior by reformu-




















for h ∈ H. Note also that, in switching from returns to rates of return (given (6)), (2)
becomes
ri > 0 for i ∈ I. (8)
The important advantage of this reformulation stems from a second basic observation.
(ii) There are "no fast bucks,"














bi0) > 0 for some b0, every household would want to buy
an unbounded portfolio (in the same proportions as b0) today, and thereby attain un-
limited consumption today (when
X
i
bi0 < 0) or the prospect of unlimited consumption




(9) amounts to the analogue for ﬁnance of the familiar "no free lunch" postulate
for production (explaining my choice of terminology). For my purposes it has an ex-
tremely useful restatement, whose full proof is fairly lengthy and therefore deferred to
the Appendix.Lemma 1. There are ”no fast bucks”, condition (9), if and only if there are some
positive values for wealth in each state, ψs > 0 for s ∈ S, such that the value of each
bond’s returns equals its price,
X
s
ψsPis = ψi or, equivalently,
X
s
ψsris =1for i ∈ I. (10)
These values can be interpreted as the prices associated with σ Arrow securities —
where the return from the sth such security is one dollar if state s occurs, and nothing
otherwise, and where, for example, the set of returns generated by varying a portfolio
consisting of one dollar’s worth of these securities contains the set generated by vary-
ing one dollar’s worth of the original bonds. In other words, when ι<σ ,L e m m a1
means that investing in the original bonds is tantamount to investing (subject to some
additional linear constraints) in Arrow-Debreu securities. (Precisely, in dollar terms, a
particular portfolio of original bonds b0 is equivalent to the portfolio of Arrow-Debreu se-






riσbi0).) A fortiori, when ι = σ —a n dt h e
rates of return ri for i ∈ I are linearly independent — the two investment opportunities
are identical.2
One ﬁnal observation permits adopting an especially convenient normalization for
the spot market prices of goods and rates of return on bonds.
(iii) Goods prices are nonnegative and nontrivial in each spot market,
p0 > 0 and p1s > 0 for s ∈ S. (11)
Otherwise, for example, if p0c < 0 for some c or p0 =0 , every household would want
to attain unlimited consumption today.
By virtue of the fact that each budget constraint in (7) is unaﬀected upon being mul-
tiplied through by a positive constant, (10) and (11) enable me to concentrate attention
on prices and rates of return satisfying







2Lemma 1 can therefore be viewed as an extension of the characterization in Cass-Stiglitz [2] (Ap-
pendix I, pp. 149-153). As far as I can now recollect, this general sort of result — as well as its general
method of proof — were ﬁrst suggested to me by Steve Ross during the early 1970s.and
r ∈ R = {r : ri = 0 and
X
s
ris =1for i ∈ I},
respectively, where it will be very useful in the sequel to represent the whole array of
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.
(Formally, given p satisfying (11) and r satisfying both (8) and (9) — and hence also














ψsp1sc) for s ∈ S
and
ris0 = ψsris for s ∈ S,i ∈ I,










for h ∈ H.)
An attentive reader may have noticed that in going from the formulation (5) to (7),
and then from the parameters (p,r) to (p0,r0) ∈ P × R,w eh a v el o s tt r a c ko fs o m e
of the original structure of the model. In particular, it might appear as if we need to
account for which subset of R corresponds to the original speciﬁcation of returns. This
turns out, however, not to be a relevant consideration; both my existence results and
my optimality characterization are stated in terms of an arbitrary element of R — and,
from the preceding argument, we now know that any conﬁguration of bond prices and
their returns which may prevail in competitive equilibrium must yield some r ∈ R.3
3It is perhaps worth remarking too that, given the maintained assumption (2), there always exist
positive bond prices such that rates of return lie in the subset R;s i m p l yp i c kany Arrow-Debreu security
prices ψ







is > 0 for i ∈ I.4. Financial Equilibrium
Let x =( x1,x 2,...,x η) represent a goods allocation, and b =( b1,b 2,...,b η) repre-
sent bond holdings (after today’s trading). Then, on the one hand, an allocation x is
















h for c ∈ C,s ∈ S.
On the other hand, it is Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible allocation x0 which
dominates x in terms of utility,
uh(x0
h) = uh(xh) for h ∈ H, with strict inequality for some h. (13)
Finally, given permissible rates of return r ∈ R, a price-allocation-holding triplet (p,x,b)
is a ﬁnancial equilibrium if, at the normalized prices p ∈ P, each household maxi-




















h , with equality if p1sc > 0, for c ∈ C,s ∈ S.
In analyzing the properties of ﬁnancial equilibrium it is possible (and all but indis-
pensable) to restrict attention to rates of return which are linearly independent,
r ∈ Rι = {r : r ∈ R and rank r = ι}
= {r : r ∈ R and if b ∈ Rι and
X
i
ribi =0 , then b =0 }






ribi)=0 , then b =0 }






ribi) = 0, then b =0 }.
(15)The last two identities in (15) follow directly from (9) and Lemma 1, and, in particu-
lar, the former provides explicit justiﬁcation for my asserting that such an additional







some b0 6=0 , households would be indiﬀerent between having access to the original set of
bonds and to any maximal subset yielding independent rates of return. (For elaboration
of these points, see Cass-Stiglitz [2], especially pp. 149-150.) The usefulness of imposing
(15) comes (in part) from the easily veriﬁed result that together with weak monotonic-
ity (4) — which itself implies that, at an optimal solution, each budget constraint in (7)
holds with equality — it implies that, in a ﬁnancial equilibrium, market clearing (14) is
equivalent to materials balance (12).4 In other words, by assuming that rates of return
are linearly independent, we can essentially ignore the bond markets per se. But, as we
shall see shortly, (15) also aﬀords several other substantial beneﬁts.
III. Existence of Financial Equilibrium
1. The Existence Theorem
One of the two main results in this paper is the sine qua non for any model of
competitive equilibrium, an existence proof. My basic argument takes a well-known
direction (that pioneered by Arrow and Debreu [see, especially, Debreu 3, Chapter 5]).
However, it deviates a bit from the usual route by deliberately concealing the role of
bond prices in order to avoid diﬃculties with demand irregularities. For this reason I
present it in some (but, I hope, not excessive) detail.
Theorem 1. Given the maintained assumptions about households’ endowments and
preferences, there is a ﬁnancial equilibrium (p,x,b) corresponding to every return struc-
ture r ∈ Rι.









































































clearing for bonds, and hence (again from (12)), market clearing for goods.P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .Pick a bound
X
h
ωh << ¯ x< <∞
and deﬁne the sets
Pε = {p : p ∈ P and
X
c
p0c = min[ε,1/(σ +1 ) ] ,
X
c
p1sc = min[ε,1/(σ +1 ) ]for s ∈ S}
for ε>0,a n d
X = {x : 0 5 xh 5 ¯ x for h ∈ H}.
Now consider the equilibrium model obtained from the original model when the optimal





and 0 5 x0
1 5 ¯ x
(16)
together with the identity b1 = −
X
h>1


















and 0 5 x
0
h 5 ¯ x
(17)
for h>1. Then my proof involves establishing the following series of claims.
( i )T h es e to fo p t i m a ls o l u t i o n st o( 1 6 ) ,s a y ,x1(p),i sw e l l - d e ﬁned (i.e., nonempty
and compact-valued), convex-valued and upper semi-continuous for p ∈ P.M o r e o v e r ,
(constrained) consumption demand satisﬁes (the corresponding weak form of) Walras’
law,








The set of optimal solutions to (17), say, (xh(p,r),b h(p,r)), is equally well-behaved for
(p,r) ∈ Pε × Rι, for every ε>0.
Given my assumptions on ωh and uh, these results are well-established for the prob-
lems (16) and (19). For the problems (17) and (7), they follow from exactly parallel
sorts of reasoning, once it is established that the constraint set in (17) is compact — as
I will demonstrate in the Appendix.
Lemma 2a: The correspondence (xh(p,r),b h(p,r)) is well-deﬁned, convex-valued, and
upper semi-continuous on Pε × Rι,f o rε>0. Moreover, (constrained) consumption-













h for s ∈ S, and pxh 5 pωh,
with equalities if xh << ¯ x, for (xh,b h) ∈ (xh(p,r),b h(p,r)).
(20)
Finally, if (xh,b h) ∈ (xh(p,r),b h(p,r)) and xh << ¯ x,t h e n(xh,b h) is also an optimal
solution to (7).
(ii) Given r ∈ Rι,i f(p,x,b) is a ﬁnancial equilibrium in this new model (where (7)
has been replaced by (16) for h =1and by (17) for h>1), then it is also a ﬁnancial
equilibrium in the original model.
Materials balance (12) implies that xh 5
X
h
ωh << ¯ x for h ∈ H.S oa l lt h a tn e e d s
to be shown is that if x1 is an optimal solution to (19) and b1 = −
X
h>1
bh, then (x1,b 1)
is an optimal solution to (7) for h =1 .



















































Hence, feasible solutions to (7) for h =1are also feasible solutions to (19). Furthermore,






















































for s ∈ S.H e n c e , (x1,b 1) is a feasible solution, and thus necessarily also an optimal
solution to (7) for h =1 .
(iii) Given r ∈ Rι, the correspondence φε : Pε × X ⇒ Pε × X deﬁned by
p → {x0 : x0
1 ∈ x1(p) and x0
h ∈ xh(p,r) for h>1} (21)
and
x → {p0 : p0 is an optimal solution to the problem max
p00∈Pεp00X
h
(xh − ωh)} (22)
has a ﬁxed point (p∗,x∗) ∈ φε(p∗,x∗).
This result follows from a standard argument based on the regularity properties
asserted in (i) above, and employing Kakutani’s Theorem.
(iv) Given r ∈ Rι,i fε is suﬃciently small, then a ﬁxed point (p∗,x∗) ∈ φε(p∗,x∗)
yields a ﬁnancial equilibrium (p,x,b),w h e r ep = p∗, x = x∗ and (xh,b h) is an optimal
solution to (7) with p = p∗ for h ∈ H.This result too follows from a common sort of argument, but now based, in particular,
on Walras’ laws (18) and (20) and the weak monotonicity assumption on u1. I therefore
forego a detailed demonstration (in a small, but well intentioned attempt to conserve
length).¥
As I have already mentioned in the introduction, the principal virtue of this theorem
is that it replaces ad hoc bounds on trades in (ﬁxed combinations of) contingent com-
modities (as in Hart’s argument, pursuing Radner’s approach) by economically mean-
ingful restrictions on (permissible conﬁgurations of) prices of and returns to contingent
claims (culminating in the requirement described by (15)). One might legitimately
raise the objection that, while my formulation may encompass some forms of ﬁnancial
instruments (e.g., money or ﬁxed-term bonds), others have returns which are better
conceived as being determined endogenously (e.g., stocks or commodity futures), and
are therefore not covered by the model. I will return to this question in Section V,
where I will outline, inter alia, how Theorem 1 can be utilized to analyze existence of
ﬁnancial equilibrium even under such a richer speciﬁcation.
2. A "Stability" Result
The trick employed in establishing Theorem 1 easily enables me to derive an inter-
esting result concerning the relation of ﬁnancial equilibrium to rates of return. (I plan
to illustrate its usefulness in forthcoming joint work with Martin Hellwig, in which we
investigate the structure of the set of ﬁnancial equilibria, especially as it pertains to the
eﬀects of extrinsic uncertainty in the present model). Let
E(r)={(p,x,b) : given r,(p,x,b) is a ﬁnancial equilibrium}
and
˜ E(r)={(p,x,b) : (p,x,b) ∈ E(r) and x1 is an optimal solution to (19)}
for r ∈ Rι.
Theorem 2. ˜ E(r) is nonempty and upper semi-continuous for r ∈ Rι.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .In the course of proving Theorem 1 I have already shown that
˜ E(r) 6= ∅ for r ∈ Rι. So consider a sequence {rυ} such that rυ ∈ Rι for υ = 1 and
lim
υ→∞rυ = r ∈ Rι with corresponding sequence {(pυ,x υ,b υ)} such that (pυ,x υ,b υ) ∈
˜ E(rυ) for υ = 1 and lim
υ→∞(pυ,x υ,b υ)=( p,x,b). I only need to demonstrate that
p ∈ P,t h a tx is nonnegative and satisﬁes (12) (so that, a fortiori, xh << ¯ x for h ∈ H),and that x1 is an optimal solution to (9), while (xh,b h) is an optimal solution to (7) for
h>1 (so that, a fortiori, (x1,−
X
h>1
bh) is also an optimal solution to (7) for h =1 ).
Since pυ ∈ P for υ = 1, obviously p ∈ P. Also, since xυ is nonnegative and satisﬁes
(12) for υ = 1, obviously x is nonnegative and satisﬁes (12). Hence, since x1(p) is upper
semi-continuous on p ∈ P, x1 is an optimal solution to (19). Hence, by virtue of the
weak monotonicity assumption on u1, p ∈ Pε for some 0 <ε<1/(1 + σ). Hence, since
(xh(p,r),b h(p,r)) is upper semi-continuous on, for example, Pε/2 × Rι,(xh,b h) is an
optimal solution to (7) for h>1, and the proof is complete.¥
IV. Optimality of Financial Equilibrium
It is now widely understood that, when the market structure is incomplete, compet-
itive allocation is, at best, Pareto optimal among a relatively small subset of feasible
allocations. (See, especially, the basic papers I cited earlier, Hart [7], Grossman [6] and
Gale [5].) In my formulation, this limitation can be seen very clearly by considering the
following sorts of price transaction-constrained perturbations (in contrast to the quan-
tity transaction-constrained perturbations which were natural in previous analyses of
Radner-like models).
Given a particular feasible allocation, say, ¯ x,l e t
¯ X1s = {x1s : there are x1s








h } for s ∈ S,
¯ P1s = {p1s : p1s > 0 and p1sx1s = p1sω1s for x1s ∈ ¯ X1s} for s ∈ S, and
¯ P1 = ×
s
¯ P1s,
where it will be convenient to let ω =( ω0,ω11,...,ω1σ) À 0 represent the total re-




given r ∈ Rι (and still given ¯ x), deﬁne a type 0 perturbation to be a goods allocation
x with the property that there are bond holdings b such that
xh = 0 and p1sx1s

















(23)for some p1 ∈ ¯ P1. Finally, deﬁne, for each state s,atype 1-s perturbation to be
simply a goods allocation x with the property that
x1s











Thus, for example, a price vector p1s ∈ ¯ P1s represents a support to the set ¯ X1s
(the potential resource bundles required in state s in order to improve upon just the





resource bundle available in state s), while a type 1-s perturbation x represents a
(feasible) allocation which diﬀers from ¯ x only in the consumption bundles which will be
received if state s occurs.
The point of these deﬁnitions is that they allow a straightforward characterization
of the optimality properties exhibited by ﬁnancial equilibria. In particular, they yield
an immediate analogue of the ﬁrst basic theorem of welfare.
Theorem 3. Given r ∈ Rι, suppose that (¯ p, ¯ x,¯ b) is a ﬁnancial equilibrium. Then
¯ p1 ∈ ¯ P1,a n d¯ x is Pareto optimal among both type 0 and type 1-s perturbations (for
p1 =¯ p1 and s ∈ S, respectively).
Furthermore, and perhaps even more striking, they also yield a partial converse, the
corresponding analogue of the second basic theorem of welfare.
Theorem 4. Suppose ¯ x À 0, ¯ x is feasible allocation, and ¯ x is Pareto optimal among
both type 0 and type 1-s perturbations (for some r ∈ Rι and s ∈ S, respectively). Then
there is a ¯ p ∈ P such that (¯ p, ¯ x,0) is a ﬁnancial equilibrium given initial endowments
ωh =¯ xh for h ∈ H.
Remark. For this optimality characterization, it makes no fundamental diﬀerence
whether rates of return are linearly independent, normalized, or even nonnegative. I
have speciﬁed r ∈ Rι here merely because this again involves no real loss of generality
(and also maintains consistency with my existence theorem).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 .The argument is almost identical to Grossman’s. Consider each
of the asserted conclusions in turn.
(i) p1 ∈ ¯ P1.Suppose otherwise, i.e., ¯ p1s / ∈ ¯ P1s for some s. Then there are x1s
h = 0 for h ∈ H
such that uh(¯ x0
h,...,x 1s
h ,...,¯ x1σ
h ) = uh(¯ xh) for h ∈ H and (using goods market clearing




















h = 0 for some h such that uh(¯ x0
h,...,x 1s
h ,...,¯ x1σ
h ) = uh(¯ xh) and
¯ p1sx1s






and thus (now using the weak monotonicity assumption on uh) x1s0
h À x1s
h for some h
such that uh(¯ x0
h, ...,x 1s0
h ,...,¯ x1σ
h ) >u h(¯ xh) and
¯ p1sx1s0






But the last implication contradicts the hypothesis that (¯ xh,¯ bh) is an optimal solution
to (7).
(ii) ¯ x is Pareto optimal among type 0 perturbations for p1 =¯ p1.
Suppose otherwise, i.e., there is a type 0 perturbation x0 satisfying (13). Then (using
Walras’ law (20))
¯ p1sx1s0











h) for s ∈ S,







h) = ¯ p0ω0
h for h ∈ H, with strict inequality for some h. (25)



















































h > 0.(iii) ¯ x is Pareto optimal among type 1-s perturbations for s ∈ S.
In this case an argument similar to that in (ii), but now based on the revealed
preference inequality
¯ p1sx1s0




ris¯ bi for h ∈ H, with strict inequality for some h,




h >ω 1sc for some c and s.¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . The concluding step in this argument requires the follow-
ing version of the familiar relationship between expenditure minimization and utility
maximization; the essential idea of its proof is also brieﬂyr e m a r k e di nt h eA p p e n d i x .

























h > 0, then (xh,b h) is also an optimal solution to (7).
The argument itself proceeds as follows:
Consider ﬁrst type 1-s perturbations (24). The hypothesis that ¯ x is Pareto optimal
in this class of perturbations together with the weak monotonicity assumption on uh (in
terms of x1s
h ) implies that ω1s is a boundary point of the set ¯ X1s for s ∈ S.M o r e o v e r ,
it is easily seen that ¯ X1s is also "disposable" (i.e., if x1s ∈ ¯ X1s and x1s0 = x1s,t h e n
x1s0 ∈ ¯ X1s) and convex (using the quasi-concavity assumption on uh) for s ∈ S. Hence,
by the usual application of the supporting hyperplane theorem, the set of supports ¯ P1s
is nonempty for s ∈ S, and hence the product of these sets ¯ P1 is nonempty as well.
Consider next type 0 perturbations (23), given some p1 ∈ ¯ P1.L e tz =( x0,zb) and
q =( q0,qb) represent (κ+1)— dimensional vectors, and focus on the sets of such vectorsdeﬁned by
¯ Z(p1)= {z : there is (x,b) such that xh = 0,p 1sx1s


















¯ Q(p1)={q : q>0 and qz = p0ω0 for z ∈ ¯ Z(p1)}.
Then the hypothesis that ¯ x is Pareto optimal among type 0 perturbations together
with the weak monotonicity assumption on uh (now in terms of x0
h)i m p l i e st h a t(ω0,0)
is a boundary point of ¯ Z(p1). Moreover, once again it is easily seen that this set is
"disposable" and convex. Hence, as previously, the set of supports ¯ Q(p1) must be
nonempty.
Since ¯ x is hypothesized to be a feasible allocation, materials balance (12) is satisﬁed.
So all that remains to be proven is that, given the hypothesis that ¯ x À 0, and given some
(p0,qb) ∈ ¯ Q(p1) with p1 ∈ ¯ P1, one can construct ¯ p ∈ P such that (¯ xh,0) is an optimal
solution to (7) with ωh =¯ xh and p = ¯ p for h ∈ H. Arguing somewhat informally (in
o r d e rt oa v o i dt o om a n y“ ε’s” and “δ’s”), this is established by the following series of
results.
(i) qb > 0 (so that, without loss of generality, qb =1 ) .
Suppose otherwise, i.e., p0 > 0 and qb =0 . Then (using r ∈ Rι and the continuity
and weak monotonicity assumptions on uh) we know that, for any h,i n c r e a s i n gbi
h
for some i permits increasing x1s
h for some s, and thus decreasing x0
h while (at least)






so that if qb =0 ,t h e n
p0x0 + qbzb = p0x0 <p 0ω0 = p0ω0 + qb0,
which contradicts (p0,qb) ∈ ¯ Q(p1).
(ii) p0 > 0.
Suppose otherwise, i.e., p0 =0and qb =1 . Then since by derivation we have p1s > 0
for s ∈ S, we know that, for any h,i n c r e a s i n gx0
h permits decreasing x1s
h for s ∈ S,a n dthus decreasing bi
h for some i while again (at least) maintaining uh. In other words,








so that if p0 =0 ,t h e n
p0x0 + zb = zb < 0=p0ω0 +0 ,
which contradicts (p0,1) ∈ ¯ Q(p1).
(iii) (¯ xh,0) is an optimal solution to (26) with xh =¯ xh, and therefore, by Lemma 2b,
also an optimal solution to (7) for h ∈ H.
This result follows immediately from the facts established above (p0 > 0 and qb =1 )
upon considering the particular z ∈ ¯ Z(p) generated by perturbating just (xh,b h), for
h ∈ H.
The argument is then completed simply by choosing







I emphasize once again that the central thrust of this welfare characterization is — a
point equally well stressed by Hart, Grossman and Gale — that incomplete markets inﬂict
the invisible hand with almost terminal paralysis — contrary to plausible conjecturing
based on Diamond’s seminal example [4]. In fact, given my formulation in terms of
ﬁnancial markets, one can even construct examples in which there is only a single good
and yet ﬁnancial equilibria can be Pareto ranked; I leave this as an exercise for the
interested reader.
V. Extensions
My basic approach is avowedly Walrasian: Households have full information (perfect
foresight) and behave competitively (take prices as given no matter how large their
contemplated transactions). Even within these conﬁnes, however, my results can be
almost trivially extended in several important directions.
1. Multiple Periods
Introducing a (ﬁnite) number of future periods, say, τ, presents no fundamental
analytical diﬃculty, though (as usual) it does entail horrendous notational complexity.
The only point I would emphasize about this particular extension is that, in general, the
model can still be cast in terms of one-period bonds. This follows from the observationthat, if there are active resale markets, then (for example) one τ- p e r i o db o n dw i t hp r i c e s
ψt−1s for s ∈ St−1 and returns Pts for s ∈ St, for 1 5 t 5 τ,m u s tb ee q u i v a l e n tt oa
sequence of τ one-period bonds with the same prices, and returns Pts + ψts for s ∈ St,
1 5 t<τand Pts for s ∈ St,t= τ. (Here, of course, St is an element of a partition
S(t) of all possible states of the world S,a n ds oo n ,àl am o d ed eDebreu [3, Chapter
7].)
2. Structural Interdependence
To my mind, one of the most fascinating outcomes of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie
development of the solution to the equilibrium existence problem was the explicit recog-
nition of the singular importance of some minimal commonality between households.
This speciﬁc aspect of my model deserves further serious study (requiring subtle analysis
of the interplay between endowments, preferences and ﬁnancial opportunities). Without
undertaking this intricate task myself, I can still say a bit more about weakening my
strong assumption on endowments.
Let




= the subset of states in which some return is positive
(27)
for r ∈ Rι. Then, careful scrutiny of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 4 (taking into account
Lemma A2 in the Appendix) reveals that, in these arguments, strict positivity (3) could




h À 0 and ω1s
h À 0 for s/ ∈ S+(r) (30)
for h>1.P r e s u m a b l y ,( 3 0) and (4) could be further weakened to some "irreducibility"
condition (guaranteeing appropriately positive incomes, in the manner of McKenzie [8]),
but this remains to be seen.
3. Restricted Participation
Another extension of my analysis, and one which is very signiﬁcant from an inter-
pretive viewpoint — but also not too diﬃcult from a mathematical viewpoint — is the
imposition of institutional restrictions on trading activity in the bond markets. Thebroadest formulation of such restricted participation (which is, at the same time, rela-
tively easy to handle; see, in particular, the second subsection in the Appendix) is the
following: Assume that, in addition to budget constraints, households face the ﬁnancial
constraints bh ∈ Bh ⊂ Rι for h ∈ H, where, say, (i) Bh is a closed, convex set containing
zero and (ii) −
X
h>1
Bh ⊂ B1. (Obviously, my present heavy reliance on overall arbitrage
arguments only makes sense when, in fact, B1 = Rι.) Thus, for instance, for h>1,M r .
h might not be able to buy bond 1 at all (bh ∈ Bh implies b1
h =0 ) , or might be able to
buy some subset of bonds Im ⊂ I only as a mutual fund (bh ∈ Bh implies bi = mibm
with mi > 0 for i,m ∈ Im), or might have an (absolute) upper bound on short-selling




h] = d with −∞ <d5 0).
Such restrictions (and many more) have been extensively investigated in the ﬁnance
literature, of course. But uncovering their implications within this particular model of a
ﬁnancial equilibrium seems to me a problem well worth deeper analysis in its own right.
4. Endogenous Returns
In "reality", the returns to many ﬁnancial instruments (stocks, commodity futures,
option contracts,...) depend on tomorrow’s market conditions. Within my framework,
this "fact" can be formalized by assuming that the rates of return to some subset of
bonds, say, I0 = {1,2,...,ι 0} with ι0 5 ι, are functions of tomorrow’s spot prices or, even
more generally, all spot prices, say, ri : P → {ρ : ρ ∈ Rσ,ρ= 0 and
X
s
ρs =1 } for i ∈ I0.
It is relatively straightforward to verify that almost nothing in the foregoing analysis
(of existence and optimality) is substantially aﬀected by this generalization — provided
that rates of return r =( r1(p),...,rι0
(p),...,rι) are continuous and satisfy the
dimensionality condition
r ∈ Rι (28)
for p ∈ P. The only real diﬃculty is that many "natural" speciﬁcations inherently lead
to violations of this last requirement. (On this point I strongly recommend looking
at Hart’s careful analysis of a speciﬁc example in [7].) However, such an unfortunate
circumstance needn’t raise an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining sensible results, at
least not when r can be closely approximated by a continuous function, say, rδ with
krδ − rk <δfor p ∈ P, for δ>0, for which (28) is satisﬁed.5
5My belated appreciation of the crucial importance of the distinction between R and R
ι in this context
is due largely to Martin Hellwig. An alternative approach for avoiding the diﬃc u l t yi st og u a r a n t e e
that ﬁnancial equilibrium occurs (or "usually" occurs) at spot prices p ∈ P such that r(p) ∈ R
ι. See, in
particular, the very interesting initial analysis developed, following this path, by McManus [9] (for the
polar case ι = σ).I can clearly illustrate these ideas in terms of the leading example where there are
just two bonds, the ﬁrst essentially a futures contract on good 1, the second simply
(inside) money.
Suppose that ι =2 , and that returns are described by
P1s =1+p1s1 − f1
and
P2s =1
for s ∈ S, where the nonnegative number f1 = 0 is to be determined (as part of
the ﬁnancial equilibrium). Then, these returns can be converted to rates of return












for s ∈ S, i =1 ,2. (To see that, given this speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst bond is indeed
“essentially a futures contract on good 1,” notice that it is equivalent to the mutual
fund consisting of one unit of money and one unit of a ﬁnancial instrument which costs





in state s tomorrow.
Thus, in eﬀect, f1 is the contract price for delivery of one unit of good 1 tomorrow, in
any state. For an interesting elaboration of a general model built around such futures
contracts, see Gale [5]; also, see my related analysis of ﬁnancial instruments which bear
zero price in the ﬁrst subsection of the Appendix.)
Given such a return structure, obviously r is continuous, while r ∈ Rι if and only if
p1s01 6= p1s001 for some s0,s 00 ∈ S (since otherwise r1 = r2). In order to repair this latter
defect, it is enough, for instance, simply to perturb rates of return on the ﬁrst bond










where r10 = 0,
X
s
r1s0 =1and 0 < kr10 − r2k <δ / 2, and δ>0.I believe that a similar procedure could be employed more generally, but once again,
this remains to be seen.
Appendix
My main purpose here is to justify Lemmas 1 and 2. Since in the ﬁnal section of
the paper I appeal to somewhat stronger versions of both these results, I will state
and brieﬂy sketch proofs for generalizations from which each of the two lemmas is an
immediate corollary.
A1. General Characterization of "No Fast Bucks"
In fact, positivity of bond returns (and therefore of bond prices) plays no essential
part in characterizing the absence of arbitrage possibilities on ﬁnancial markets. So
instead of (6), now consider the general case in which, for some ι0 5 ι,
ψi 6=0for i ∈ I0 = {1,2,...,ι 0},=0otherwise.
Then the argument which before led to (9) now leads to the general condition












Piβi0) > 0} = ∅, (A1)
where, as in the text,
bi ≡ ψiβi and ri ≡ Pi/ψi for i ∈ I0.
Furthermore, based on (A1), we also have a general version of Lemma 1 (which reduces
to the same thing for the special case in which (2) is satisﬁed, and thus necessarily
ι0 = ι).
Lemma A1. (A1) obtains if and only if there are ψs > 0 for s ∈ S such that
X
s
ψsris =1for i ∈ I0 (A2)
and X
s
ψsPis =0for i ∈ IÂI0. (A3)













































(necessity) Consider the closed, convex cone
W = {w : there are b0 ∈ Rι0
and β0 ∈ Rι−ι0










together with its dual
Ψ = {ψ : ψ ∈ Rσ+1 and wψ 5 0 for w ∈ W}.
Then the hypothesis (A1) is equivalent to the property that
W ∩ Rσ+1
+ = {0}, (A4)
while the relationship between a cone and its dual entails that
W = {w : w ∈ Rσ+1 and wψ 5 0 for ψ ∈ Ψ}. (A5)
It can therefore be easily seen that













Pisβi0) 5 0 for (b0,β0) ∈ Rι. (A6)
Suppose otherwise, i.e., Ψ∩Rσ+1
++ = ∅. Then, since the dual Ψ is also convex, by the
separating hyperplane theorem there is w 6=0such that
wψ 5 wψ0 for ψ ∈ Ψ,ψ0 ∈ Rσ+1
+ ,
or
w>0 such that wψ 5 0 for ψ ∈ Ψ,
or, from (A5), w ∈ W such that w>0, which contradicts (A4).Moreover, it can therefore also be easily seen that
(ii) By normalizing ψ so that ψ0 =1 , (A2) and (A3) are satisﬁed.
On the one hand, taking
bi0 =
(
±1 for i = i0
0 otherwise




ψsri0s 5 ±1 for i0 ∈ I0,
which yields (A2).
On the other hand, taking b0 =0and
βi0 =
(
±1 for i = i0
0 otherwise




ψsPi0s 5 0 for i0 ∈ IÂI0,
which yields (A3), and the proof is complete.¥
I should note that the essence of the foregoing argument (an application of the
Farkas-Minkowski Lemma) is well-known, and can be found in many standard references
on convex analysis. I chose to elaborate rather than reference it for a simple reason;
spelling it out requires about the same space as translating notation and then tailoring
results from a primary source.
It is also worth remarking explicitly that Lemma A1 permits extending my entire
analysis of existence and optimality to encompass the general situation where
bi =
(
ψiβi for i ∈ I0
βi otherwise
and
R = {r :
X
s
ris =1for i ∈ I0,=0otherwise}.Thus, for instance (taking into account the brief discussion of endogenous returns
at the end of Section V), bond ι0 +1might represent an ordinary futures contract on
good 1 (with "price" ψι0+1 =0and returns Pι0+1s = p1s1−f1 for s ∈ S, where again f1
is the delivery price in the contract), while bond 1 might represent a futures contract
on good 1 requiring partial payment in advance (with "price" ψ1 = f01 and returns
P1s = p1s1 − f11 for s ∈ S, where now f01 is the down payment in the contract).
A2. Regularity Properties of Consumption-Portfolio Demand
Rather than focusing speciﬁcally on spot prices which are nontrivial market-by-
market, switch attention to the general κ(σ+1) — dimensional unit simplex P itself. Also,
instead of considering unrestricted portfolio choice, introduce the ﬁnancial constraints
bh ∈ Bh ⊂ Rι, where, as in the text, Bh is a closed, convex set containing zero, for
h ∈ H. Finally, parallel with the latter generalization, now let
S+





bi > 0 for s0 = s,= 0 otherwise}
for r ∈ Rι, for h ∈ H. Then we have the following general version of Lemmas 2a and
2b (where, to simplify notation, I write p for p and omit the household subscript).
Lemma A2. The optimal solutions to the problem
maximize u(x0)




p1sx1s0 5 p1sω1s +
X
i
risbi0 for s ∈ S,





are well-deﬁned and convex-valued for (p,r) ∈ P × Rι. Furthermore, (i) they are upper
semi-continuous at (p,r) if p0ω0 > 0 and p1sω1s > 0 for s/ ∈ S+(r); (ii) they satisfy




bi 5 p0ω0,p 1sx1s 5 p1sω1s +
X
i
risbi for s ∈ S, and
px 5 pω, with equalities if x< <¯ x;and (iii) they yield optimal solutions to the same problem without the constraint x0 5 ¯ x
at (p,r) if x< <¯ x, p0ω0 > 0 and p1sω1s > 0 for s/ ∈ S+(r). Finally, optimal solutions





subject to u(x0) = u(x),
p1sx1s0 5 p1sω1s +
X
i









bi = p0ω0, and conversely if p0ω0 > 0.
P r o o fo fL e m m aA 2 . Since verifying these properties is (after the "Walrasian"
revolution) such a routine procedure, I will only indicate how the usual arguments need
to be modiﬁed here. Such modiﬁcations are basically of two kinds. Let
F(p,r)={(x,b):( x,b) is a feasible solution to (A7)}
for (p,r) ∈ P × Rι.
(i) Compactness of F(p,r).
Obviously, F(p,r) is closed. That it is also bounded follows directly from the con-
straint 0 5 x0 5 ¯ x and the hypothesis (p,r) ∈ P×Rι. To see this, suppose otherwise, i.e.,
there is a sequence {(xυ,b υ)} such that (xυ,b υ) ∈ F(p,r) for υ = 1 but lim
υ→∞kbυk = ∞.
Then consider the normalized sequence of portfolio holdings bυ0 = bυ/kbυk for υ = 1.
Without loss of generality we can assume that lim
υ→∞(xυ,b υ0)=( x,b0) with kb0k =1 .







(p1s/kbυk)x1sυ 5 (p1s/kbυk)ω1s +
X
i








which (using r ∈ Rι) contradicts the deﬁnition (15).
(ii) Continuity of F(p,r).
Since B is closed, while the other constraints deﬁning F are linear inequalities, this
correspondence is obviously upper semi-continuous on P × Rι. That it is also lower
semi-continuous when p0ω0 > 0 and p1sω1s > 0 for s/ ∈ S+(r) follows directly from the
observation that, since B is convex, there is b+(r) ∈ B such that
X
i
risbi+(r) > 0 for s ∈ S+(r),= 0 otherwise.





p1sx1s0 <p 1sω1s +
X
i
risbi0 for s ∈ S,
0 5 x0 5 ¯ x
and
b0 ∈ B
for (x0,b 0)=( 1− ε)(x,b)+εδ(0,b +(r)) and ε,δ > 0 suﬃciently close to 0. Hence,
(x0,b 0) ∈ F(p0,r0) for (p0,r0) ∈ P × Rι suﬃciently close to (p,r).¥
Perhaps I should also note in passing that the arguments establishing that, under
suitable conditions, optimal solutions to (A7) or (A8) yield optimal solution to (A7)
without the constraint x0 5 ¯ x are also essentially identical to those for the textbook
model of household behavior. Again, I leave the details to the interested reader.
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